With the rapid growth in multimedia services and the enormous offers of video content in online social networks, users have difficulty in obtaining their interests. Therefore, various personalized recommendation systems have been proposed. However, they ignore that the accelerated proliferation of social media data has led to the big data era, which has greatly impeded the process of video recommendation. In addition, none of them has considered both the privacy of users' contexts (e.g., social status, ages, and hobbies) and video service vendors' repositories, which are extremely sensitive and of significant commercial value. To handle these problems, we propose a cloud-assisted differentially private video recommendation system based on distributed online learning. In our framework, service vendors are modeled as distributed cooperative learners, recommending videos according to user's context, while simultaneously adapting the video-selection strategy based on user-click feedback to maximize total user clicks (reward). Considering the sparsity and heterogeneity of big social media data, we also propose a novel geometric differentially private model, which can greatly reduce the performance loss. Our simulation shows the proposed algorithms outperform other existing methods and keep a delicate balance between the total reward and privacy preserving level.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N recent years, online social networks (OSNs) have been massively growing, where users can share and consume all kinds of multimedia contents. As a result, given the numerous different genres of videos in social media, how to discover the videos of personal interest and recommend them to individual users are of great significance. Recommendation is foreseen to be one of the most important services that can provide such personalized multimedia contents to users [1] . Several companies have demonstrated initial successes in multimedia recommendation system design. [3] reported that YouTube won its first Emmy for video recommendations. Actually, most OSNs recommend video content to their users based on the users' rich context information (e.g., social status, ages, professions, health conditions and hobbies) contained in their released multimedia data. Regarding this way, several recommendation systems have been proposed [24] , [32] .
However, there exist two major challenges in this scenario. The first challenge comes from the big data's role in the personalized recommendation. In detail, OSNs have accelerated the popularity of applications and services, resulting in the explosive increase of social multimedia data. In this case, multimedia big data puts companies in a favorite position to have access to much more contextual information [2] . However, how to harness and actually use big data to effectively personalize recommendation are a monumental task. Traditional stand-alone multimedia systems cannot handle the storage and processing of this large-scale datasets [7] . Besides, complex and various user-generated multimedia big data in the OSNs results in the sparsity and heterogeneity of users' context data. Hence, it is challenging to implement recommendation with the multimedia big data.
Furthermore, the privacy in recommendation has raised widely concern. On the one hand, as declared in [5] , user's sensitive context information may be exposed by the recommendation results. Intuitively, the more detailed the information related to the user is, the more accurate the recommendations for the user are. But once the recommendation records are accessed by a malicious third party, individual features can be inferred by them merely based on the recommendation outcome. For example, advertising video of luxury goods recommended to a particular person indicate the income level of this user. Also basketball video recommendation implies user's hobby. Then with additional side information, the malicious party may identify the person in real life. On the other hand, the inventory of videos is an important commercial secret for the service vendor. As for the service vendors' incentives, they rely on stored video source files to gain popularity among users. Intuitively, video service vendors are selfish and they refuse the inference of what they have in the inventories and the revenue gain of each video. Consequently, avoiding the divulge of video contents of each service vendor is desirable.
Taking the above two difficulties into consideration, establishing a privacy-preserving video recommendation system with multimedia bid data can be extremely challenging. Traditional recommender systems for multimedia, including collaborative 1520-9210 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. filtering (CF) [10] and content-based (CB) recommendation [9] can provide meaningful multimedia recommendations at an individual level. However, their stand-alone systems have difficulties in dealing with tremendous high-dimensional multimedia big data. As for the privacy concern in recommendation, previously, anonymity was the main tool in recommendation [11] . But that the information can only be partially removed will allow for re-identification. Differential privacy [12] proposed recently is a heuristic method to solve this problem. Informally, differential privacy means that the output is going to be almost exactly the same whether it includes a single user's data in the input datasets or not. Therefore, hardly can one make an accurate inference on signal user's feature based on the recommendation results. Besides, adding Laplace noise into the recommendation rewards can hide small changes that arise from a single video's contribution. Thus, the revenue gain of one signal video cannot be deduced. Several studies have incorporated it into recommendation systems [13] , [14] , but their works only focus on small-scale media datasets. Due to the fact that executing differential privacy in a large datasets often impacts little on accuracy [4] , we implement differential privacy in our model, which works extremely efficiently in the context of big data.
In this paper, we introduce differential privacy into distributed online learning to design an efficient and high-accurate timely recommendation system based on multimedia cloud computing [15] . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , user-generated multimedia big data (e.g., images, audio clips and videos) is first translated to remote media cloud and stored in decentralized data centers (DCs). Then the system uses technologies such like Bag-of-Features Tagging [6] to extract user's context vectors and convert the results to distributed video service vendors (servers). Finally recommended video contents are pushed to multimedia applications in OSNs.
Our main theme in this media cloud based scenario is that video service vendors are modeled as decentralized online learners, who try to learn from user's high-dimensional context data and match it to the optimal video. The service vendors are connected together via a fixed network over the media cloud, each of whom experience inflows of users' context vectors to them. If service vendors cannot find suitable videos in their repositories for the coming user, they can forward the use's context data to neighbor service vendors, who will select one video from his repository for this user. At the end of each time slot, the reward of the recommended video is observed. Service ven-dors can learn from the result and adjust their selection strategy next time. Since the extracted context vectors from multimedia big data are high-dimensional and omnifarious, the context space with d dimensions (d is the number of user features) can be extremely huge and heterogeneous. Then, learning the most matchable video for each individual can be extremely slow. Therefore, each service vendor initially groups users (partition the context space) with similar context into rough crowds, and then they dynamically refine the partition strategies over time.
To goal of each service vendor is to maximize its long term expected total recommendation reward and do not want to reveal their repositories to other service vendors. However, in the cooperation, each service vendor will share some information such as the users' context vectors and the videos' revenue gains with neighbor service vendors. Then, service vendors can infer the repositories of other service vendors from the shared information. To solve this privacy leakage, we adopt Laplace mechanism [12] , adding noise to shared revenue gains. As for the users' privacy, to prevent the exposure of their features by the recommendation videos, adding noise to the revenue gains is noneffective. Because the recommended outcome is revealed before noise is added. Thus, we employ exponential mechanism [16] to protect the users' privacy, where the service vendors randomly select the video according computed exponential probabilities. Faced with the fact that user's contexts (d-dimensional point in the context space) are sparse distributed over the context space, we propose a novel geometric differentially private method to promote the total reward. This paper makes the following contributions.
1) We propose a media cloud based video recommendation system and rigorously formulate it as a distributed online learning problem. In our model, decentralized service vendors work cooperatively to deal with large-scale contextual data. 2) To handle the dimensionality and sparsity of the multimedia big data, our method adaptively partitions the context space for each service vendor. Our evaluation results show this method has lower performance loss and converges fast to optimal strategy. 3) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to deal with the privacy issue of both the social media users and video service vendors in recommendation. We integrate exponential mechanism and Laplace mechanism simultaneously into distributed learning systems. We guarantee ε-differential privacy while not coming at substantial expense in total reward. 4) We propose a "geometric differentially private model" to deal with the sparse contextual data, which can reduce the performance loss extensively. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the related work. Section III presents the necessary background concepts of this study. In Section IV, we detail the system model, define our performance metric, the adversary model and design goals. Section V describes the design of algorithms and provides theoretical analysis of the performances. In Section VI, we present our geometric differentially private model. Section VII discusses our experimental results and analysis. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several recommendation algorithms have been exploited in the past. CB filtering recommendation systems [17] - [19] focus on the similarities of content titles, tags and descriptions and they find user-interested items based on user's individual reading history. CB recommendation systems are easy to deploy. Nonetheless, simply representing the users profile information by a bag of words is not sufficient to capture the exact interests of the user. CF recommendation systems [20] , [21] rely on abundant user transaction histories and content popularity. CF systems require enough history consumption record and feedback, which is not suitable to real-time recommendation. Graph-based (GB) recommendation systems [22] , [23] build a graph to calculate the correlation between recommendation objects. Then, recommendation problem turns into a node selection problem on a graph. Besides that, users' friendships in social network are described by a graph. Combining graph theory with recommendation is a marvellous idea. However, in OSNs, this graph can be continuously changeable. Constructing and storing such graph are impractical. Context-aware recommendation systems make recommendation based on the contextual information both of items and users. Li et al. [24] has done a pioneering in this area, but its centralized framework fails to satisfy the need of big data environment. Our distributed cooperative recommendation framework can arrange recommendation timely under big data environment and provides rigorous performance guarantees.
As for the privacy in recommendation systems, anonymity was the main tool [11] . However, especially for rich, highdimensional big data, most anonymization techniques appear to cripple the utility of the data [25] , [26] . In addition, though anonymized, users may be re-identification in the presence of colluding adversaries or those with auxiliary information [28] . On the other hand, prior works lay emphasis on cryptography [27] to make the privacy-sensitive data inaccessible to any outsiders and the server by means of encryption. Security of these methods can be formally proven. But they usually incur high computation and communication overheads. Differential privacy [12] proposed in recent years has been incorporated into recommendation by several studies. McSherry and Mironov [14] show how to adapt the leading algorithms used in the Netflix Prize competition to make privacy-preserving recommendations. This is typically accomplished by adding noise to the item covariance matrix, to hide small changes that arise from a single users contribution. Machanavajjhala et al. [8] and Jorgensen and Yu [13] combine differential privacy with social graph for recommendation. But their work only studies the privacy of sensitive user-item preferences and connections between people, rather than individual features. Our study aims at the privacy of individual features contained in their context data and the secrecy of service vendors' data. The main differences between our work and the prior related works as listed in Table I .
III. BACKGROUNDS

A. Differential Privacy
The concept of differential privacy is originally introduced by Dwork et al. [12] , which gives us a riorous definition of privacy.
Definition 1: (Differential Privacy [12] ). A randomized algorithm A has ε differential privacy if for any two input sets A and B differing on a single entry, and for any set of outcomes R ∈ Range(A)
Informally, differential privacy means that the outcome of two nearly identical input datasets (different for a single component) [17]- [19] CB \ None C [20] , [21] CF \ None C [22] , [23] GB \ None C [25] CA \ None C [32] CA \ None D [11] Hybrid CF A User C [27] CF Cr User C [13] GB DP User D [14] CF DP User C [8] GB DP User C Our work CA DP User, D service provider D should also be nearly identical. Thus, individual information can hardly be inferred by comparing the query result of A and B. In our model, the input datasets are users' context vectors. The privacy ε is the parameter to measure the privacy level of the algorithm. The choice of ε is a tradeoff between the privacy and the accuracy of the output. One effective tool is the Laplace Mechanism [12] , i.e.,
In this way, f () is a counting query on the data set X, and Lap() is the Laplace distribution with standard deviation √ 2Δf ε to scale the counting query result. Definition 2: (Sensitivity of Laplace mechanism [34] ). The sensitivity of a function f is
where x and y are input datasets differ on at most one component. The sensitivity of a function f captures the magnitude, by which a single component can change the function f in the worst case. Indeed, the sensitivity of a function gives an upper bound on how much we must perturb its output to preserve privacy. Corollary 1: (Composability [16] ). The sequential application of randomized computation A i , each giving ε i differential privacy, yields i ε i differential privacy.
Referring to differential privacy, another powerful tool is the exponential mechanism [16] . The exponential mechanism M E (x,u,R) selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp( εu(x,r) 2Δu ). Here, x is the input data set we want to protect, r is the output of the mechanism and u(x, k) is the unity function. There is also a definition of the sensitivity.
Definition 3: (Sensitivity of Exponential Mechanism [34] ). The sensitivity of exponential mechanism is defined as follows:
The sensitivity measures the change of utility function u(x, r), when one item in targeted data set changes. An important theorem can also be derived as [34] .
Theorem 1: Fixing a database x, let R O P T = {r ∈ R : u(x, r) = OP T u (x)} denote the set of elements in R which attain utility score OP T u (x). Then, When used to select an output r ∈ R, the exponential mechanism ε ε q (x) ensures that
B. Online Learning
Our proposed distributed learning method derives from contextual bandits [29] . This algorithm learns form the context information available at each time, which, in this case, is the users' context vectors. Then, it keeps an index that weights the estimated performance and uncertainty of each action (recommended video or neighbor service vendor in this case) and choose the action with highest index at each time. Furthermore, the indices for the next time slot for all actions are updated based on the feedback received from the chosen action (users click feedback). There exist some work studying the contextual bandit [29] , [30] , where the best action given the context is learned online. C. Tekin et al. first proposed a distributed contextual bandit framework for big data classification [31] and social recommendations [32] . But the uniform partition method proposed in their work does not fit into the sparse big data. A context-aware partition method for big data proposed in [33] is a heuristic work. Nonetheless, the single-learner framework can not satisfy the need of the massive multimedia big data. We combine adaptive context space partition with distributed learning, which can efficiently handle above difficulties.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the system model and assumptions. Then we give our performance metric. Finally, we outline the adversary model and design goals.
A. System Model
The system model is shown in Fig. 2 . There are M distributed service vendors distributed in media cloud, which are indexed by set M = {1, 2, 3 . . . , M}. They work independently and cooperatively in discrete time setting t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Each vendor owns a set of videos. We denote the set of videos M i = {k 1, k 2,..., k K } for service vendor i. At each time slot, the following events happen sequentially for service vendor i: 1) a user's extracted context vector x i (t) comes to service vendor i; 2) The service vendor i chooses one video from his repository M i or sends the context vector to neighbor service vendor j, who will select one video from M j for the user with this context; 3) At the end of each time slot, the user's click feedback f k,x i (t) (t) (If user clicks, it equals one, otherwise zero, where k is the recommended video.) is observed; 4) The service vendor i learns from the feedback, then promotes the selection strategy for next user.
We describe the details and some reasonable assumptions here.
1) Each service vendor has access to only its own video repository. Service vendors are selfish in the sense that, they do not reveal their repositories to other service vendors. But they know the number of videos of other service vendors. In this article, we assume every service vendor possesses K videos.
2) The context information x i (t) is a high-dimensional vector. Each coordinate of the vector represents the feature of the user (e.g., gender, hobby, profession and age). We use the hypercube X = [0, 1] d to denote its range, where d is the dimension of the space. Given the setting of big data, d is extremely large and the points of those context vectors are distributed non-uniformed in the hypercube space. 3) At the end of each time slot, we use a random variable f k,x (t) to represent the reward (user click feedback) produced by the recommended video k. If user clicks the recommended video k, it equals one, otherwise zero. Let u k,x be the expected reward of video k conditional on the context x. Different videos have different expected reward for the same context. We aim to find the videos with the highest expected reward for different users (context vectors). Naturally, similar contexts have similar expected reward with the same video. We use the Lipschitz condition to describe this similarity
The goal of the service vendor is to try its best to recommend video with highest expected reward. Consequently, if the service vendor does not have matchable video to its coming user, he will forward the it's context vector to neighbor service vendor. Our algorithm chooses another service vendor by comparing the average rewards of each service vendor with those of its own videos. We use M −i = M − {i} denotes the set of other service vendors. Let K i = M i ∪ M −i . To be reasonable, we call K i the set of arms of service vendor i, which is equal to the union of the set of videos and other service vendors.
B. Performance Metric
Definition 4: (Optimal Arm). Our benchmark when evaluating the performance of the learning algorithm is the optimal solution, which selects the arm k with the highest expected reward from the set K i = M i ∩ M −i given context x i (t) at time t. Specifically, the optimal arm we compare against is given by
Knowing the optimal solution means that learner i (service vendor i in this case) knows the arm in K i that yields the highest expected reward for each x i (t) ∈ X .
Definition 5: (The Regret of Learning). We define the regret as a performance measure of the learning algorithm used by the learners. Simply, the regret of a learning algorithm for learner i is the total reward gap between optimal arms and selected arms
where k i (t) denotes the video or neighbor service vendor chosen at time t, k * (x i (t)) denotes the best choise for context x i (t). Regret gives the convergence rate of the total expected reward of the learning algorithm to the value of the optimal solution.
C. Adversary Model and Design Goals
Similar to the privacy concerns proposed in [5] , we consider a adversary model as follows: 1) Malicious third party who can gain access to the recommendation outputs and owns some side information such as location about some users. The goal of this malicious third part is to deduce a particular user's features by observing the recommendation outputs. Then, they can identify the media user in the real world with deduced features and additional side information. 2) Selfish and curious service vendors who want to infer neighbors' repositories from shared information. For example, the curious service vendor forwards a sports fan's context vector to a neighbor service vendor, who receives a high reward from its recommendation. Since the reward is shared with the curious service vendor for estimation, the curious service vendors infer that this neighbor service vendor may own a video about sport.
To address the adversary models above, we proposed a differentially private learning algorithm. Our scheme achieves privacy protection and performance guarantees as follows.
1) Users' privacy guarantee: Even if the malicious party can gain access to the recommendation outputs, it is less likely for it to infer the user's feature from the recommended result. And we prove that our proposed algorithm can preserve ε-differential privacy for user's privacy. 2) Service vendors' privacy guarantee: The video of neighbor service vendors cannot be inferred by shared information.
The proposed algorithm can preserve ε-differential privacy for service vendors. 3) Performance guarantee: The proposed algorithm can guarantee the regret in equation (6) is sublinear converged, i.e.,
A smaller γ will result in faster convergent rate. 4) Privacy-reward tradeoff: Our analysis shows that the higher the privacy level is preserved, the lower the total reward is received. By varying the value of the privacy parameter ε, we can keep a tradeoff between the total recommendation reward and the privacy preservation level.
V. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED ONLINE LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR CLOUD-BASED VIDEO RECOMMENDATION
Since the reward of each recommended video for different users has unknown stochastic distributions, the natural way to learn a video's performance is to record and update its sample mean reward for the same context vector. Using such an empirical value to evaluate the expected reward is the basic approach to help the service vendors to learn. However, the context space X can be very large, recording and updating the sample mean reward for each context are scarcely possible. The memory capacity of the sever can not meet the need of keeping a sample mean reward for all contexts. To overcome the difficulty, we dynamically partition the entire context space into multiple smaller context subspaces (according to the number of arriving users). Then, we maintain and update the sample mean reward estimates for each subspace. This is due to the fact that the expected rewards of a video are likely to be similar for similar contexts.
In our distributed framework, each service vendor i ∈ M dynamically partitions the context space X when context x i (t) arrives to them. To better understand the proposed Private Distributed learning with Adaptive context space Partition algorithm (P-DAP) algorithm, we apart it into two algorithms, i.e., Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Service vendor i runs Algorithm 1 to select video or request neighbor service vendor's help for its own user. Because service vendor i does not outward recommendation revenue gain to other service vendors, we only need to protect user's privacy and we adopt exponential mechanism in Algorithm 1 (named as ExP-distributed learning with adaptive partition (DAP)) to achieve this protection. When service vendor i receives users' extracted context vectors forwarded from other service vendors, it runs Algorithm 2 (named as LaP-DAP) to select videos and protect the privacy of selected videos. Two algorithms are carried out simultaneously, although we describe them separately.
Next we present our online learning algorithm. In Section VI, we will refine the proposed algorithm to geometric differential privacy to reduce the performance loss.
A. Algorithm Description
In this section, we describe our differentially P-DAP for video recommendation. We first introduce several useful concepts for describing the proposed algorithm. 1) Context subspace: A context subspace C is a subspace of the entire context space X , i.e., C ⊆ X . In this paper, all context subspaces are created by uniformly partitioning the context space on each dimension. Thus, each context subspace is a d-dimensional hypercube with side length being m −l , where m is number of segmentations of each dimension to be partitioned and l is the partition level.
To be specific, when we assign m = 2, d = 1 and entire space is A context subspace C is active if it is in the current context subspace set P t , i.e. C ∈ P t . 3) Notations: For service vendor i and each active context subspace C ∈ P t , the algorithm maintains a counter N i k,C (t) recording the number of times when k is selected for contexts belong to subspace C. r i k,C (t) denotes the sample mean reward of video k for the context subspace C up to time t. We haver i k,C (t) = Algorithm 1: ExP-DAP for service vendor i's own user.
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The algorithm also maintains a counter M i C (t) that records the number of all the contexts that had arrived to subspace C from its creation up to time t.
To begin with, we present our Algorithm 1 in the following 3 phases.
Phase 1: Exploration and Reward Estimation
Upon each context data arrival, service vendor i first checks to which subspace C in the set P t the context belongs and the level of C. To get accurate performance estimation of each arm k ∈ M i , service vendor i needs to judge whether k has been fully explored (line 4, 5). Since service vendor i does not know the performance service vendor k's videos, it needs to send neighbor service vendor k some context samples to train it and make sure it will mostly select optimal video. The N i 1,k ,C (t) denotes the times when k ∈ M −i is selected for training. In the training process, service vendor i dose not need to communicate with service vendor k to observe the reward f i k,x i (t) (t) (line 6, 7). If each service vendor k ∈ M −i has been fully trained, service vendor i starts to explore the performance of leaner k ∈ M −i and observe the reward of each k (line 8, 9) . The control function G 1,C (t), G 2,C (t) and G 3,C (t) ensure that video is selected sufficiently many number of times so that the sample mean estimate r i k,C (t) is accurate enough. And the algorithm sets different control function for k ∈ M −i and k ∈ M i , i.e., G 2,C (t) is larger than G 1,C (t). Because for k ∈ M −i , the re- ward r i k,C (t) is added with noise, there should be need more times for evaluating performance of k ∈ M −i . Since arms selected in the exploration process are almost non-optimal, which have weak relevance with the individuals' attributes, individual privacy are less likely to be exposed in this phase. Algorithm 1 preserves the privacy in exploitation (Phase 2).
Phase 2: Decision With Privacy Protection
For subspace C, when all arms have been fully explored, there are accurate sample mean estimations for each arm. In traditional bandit algorithms, the learners (service vendor in this case) usually select the arm with the highest sample mean reward. However, the optimal arm will expose the individual feature. Thus, to protect the user's privacy, service vendor i first randomly choose one arm k i ∈ M i according to the computed probability distribution, where Δu is the sensitivity of exponential mechanism (line 11-14). Then, it select another arm k j ∈ M −i with the highest estimated reward. Finally service vendor i compare the estimated reward of k j and k i , then it select the one with higher estimated reward for context x i (t) (line 15, 16). We will prove this randomly selection scenario guarantee ε-differential privacy in next our analysis section.
Phase 3: Update and Partition the Context Subspace
At the end of each time slot, the algorithm first updates M i C (t),r i k,C (t) and N i k,
Then the algorithm decides whether to further partition the current subspace C, depending on whether we have sufficient context vectors arrivals in C. Specifically, if M i C (t) ≥ Am pl at time t, C will be further partitioned, where p and m are positive numbers. When partitioning is needed, C is uniformly partitioned into m d smaller hypercubes. Each hypercube is a level-(l + 1) subspace with side-length 1/m of that of C. Then C is removed from the current context set P t . New subspaces are added into P t . Fig. 3 provides us an illustration of this partition process when m = 2, d = 2.
Then, we describe Algorithm 2 as follows. In our problem setting, in order to protect the privacy of neighbor service vendors, we face a big challenge that traditional differential privacy only apply to static database. By contrast, the datasets we want to protect are dynamically releasing over time. In detail, suppose at every time step t ∈ [T ], one entry from dataset D, f k,x(t) ∈ {0, 1} arrives and the task is to output v t = t τ =1 f k,x(τ ) while ensuring the complete output sequence v 1 , . . . , v T is ε-differential private. To overcome this challenge, we use a tree based aggregation method initially proposed by Dwork [36] , Chan [35] . Tree-based aggregation. Assume for simplicity that T = 2 α for some positive integer α. We create a binary tree, i.e., T ree k for each video k ∈ M i with its leaf nodes being f 1 , . . . , f T . As illustrated in Fig. 4 , at each time slot, when new reward is produced, we insert the value of the reward into the leaf node. Over the entire time sequence [T ], the rewards are inserted sequentially. Each internal node x in T ree k stores the sum of all the leaf nodes in the tree rooted at x. First notice that one can compute any v t using at most log(T ) nodes of T ree k . Second, notice that for any two neighboring datasets D and D different in leaf node f i and f i at most log(T ) nodes in T ree k gets modified. So, if we flatten the complete tree as a vector then for any neighboring datasets D and D one can easily show that T ree(D) − T ree(D ) 1 ≤ log(T ). We will further bound the amount of the noise added to each tree in Section V when evaluating the performance of our algorithm. Select k and insert observed f i k,C (t). 7: else 8: Select k * = arg max k ∈M i r i k,C (t) and observe f i k * ,x j (t) (t).
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LaP-DAP description. When service vendor i receives context x j (t) from service vendor j, service vendor i first determines the subspace C to which this context belongs and the level l of it. Then it wants to make sure whether each video k ∈ M i has been selected for enough times for accurate estimation (line 4-6). If each video has been explored sufficiently, service vendor i selects the video k * with highest reward, then observes the f i k * ,x j (t) (t). Because after the training process, service vendor j can gain access to this observed reward of service vendor i and make evaluation of the performance of service vendor i based on it. To preserve the privacy of service vendor i regarding this information, the algorithm adds Laplace noise with deviation λ = K log(T ) ε to f i k * ,x j (t) (t) (line 7-9). Finally service vendor i updates some counters and judge whether to partition the subspace C as described in Phase 3 (line 11-14) .
B. Algorithm Analysis
The properties of the proposed algorithm are analyzed in this section. For simplicity of presentation, we replace service vendors with learners. We prove that the regret is sublinear converged over the time, and our P-DAP guarantees differential privacy.
1) Regret bound: For each subspace C, let u k,C = sup x∈C u k,x and u k,C = inf x∈C u k,x . Let x * be the context at the center of the hypercube C. We define the optimal arm for subspce C as k * = arg max k ∈K i u k,x * . Then the suboptimal arms for learner i in subspace C can be written as follows:
where B is a constant and α > 0. We will bound B to get optimal solution. The regret in (6) can be written as the sum of three components
where R i o (T ) is the regret due to selecting suboptimal arms from M i by time T , R i s (T ) is the regret due to selecting suboptimal arms from M −i and R i n (T ) is the regret of near optimal selections by time T . Next, we bound each of these terms separately. Proof: The regret of E[Reg o k,C (T )] is due to: 1) inherent gap of bandit algorithm between the optimal selections and the suboptimal selections; 2) the gap between approximately optimal reward applying exponential mechanism and suboptimal selections (line 11-14 in Algorithm 1)
= E Reg 1 k,C (T ) + E Reg 2 k,C (T ) . (10) Next, we will bound the two part of the E[Reg o k,C (T )] separately:
Lemma 1: The inherent regret gap of bandit algorithm between optimal arms and suboptimal arms E[Reg 1 k,c (T )] is bounded as follows:
Proof. The proof is the same as proof of Lemma 1 in [37] . Before we derive Lemma 3, we provide a bound on the sensitivity of exponential mechanism.
Lemma 2: The sensitivity of exponential mechanism is bounded is follows:
Proof: In our framework, x 1 and x 2 are two input data (users' context vectors), which differ on at most one component. The unity function u(x, k) represents the recommendation reward depending on input context x and output video k. By Definition 3 and inequality (4), we have
Combining Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, we can derive Lemma 3 as follows:
Lemma 3: The regret due to the near optimal reward when applying exponential mechanism can be bounded as follows:
Proof: At each time slot, we do not choose the arm with highest reward. Instead, we assign each arm a probability to be chosen. Thus, at each time slot, there exists the gap of reward when applying the randomly selection. By using Theorem 1, in inequality (6), we have |R| = K, |R O P T | = 1 (we only have one optimal arm). Then, we set t = ln(T ). Thus, at each time slot, we have the regret by randomly selection as follows:
which holds with a probability less than 1 T . Then, we have
where Δq = u(x, k) − u(x, ε ε u (x)) = u k,x(t) − u ε ε u (x(t)),x(t) ≤ 2Δu ε (ln(K) + ln(T )) denotes the regret bound of exponential mechanism selection at each time slot.
Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and inequality (10), our Theorem 2 holds.
The above Theorem 2 implies that for k ∈ M i , the proposed algorithm make sure the suboptimal arms will be selected more than m 2αl ln(T ) with very small probability.
Lemma 4: For k ∈ M −i , with control function G 2,C (t) = m 2αl ln(t) + Γ 4 m αl and G 3,C (t) = m 2αl ln(t)/K, we have the regret of choosing suboptimal k in subspace C by time T as follows:
where Γ is the near maximum value of the amount of total noise added by time T . We will bound Γ in Lemma 5.
Proof: This proof is the same as proof of Lemma 4 in [37] . When we add Laplace noise to each time reward, our estimate of the actual reward will be disturbed and our number of times that need to be played until finding the optimal arm will be increased. But we demonstrate that there will be less likely for a suboptimal arm to be tried more than 2m 2αl ln(T ) + Γ 4 m αl times before finding the optimal arm with a high probability.
Lemma 5: For all arms k ∈ M −i and all time step t ∈ [T ], w.p. ≥ 1 − σ (over the randomness), the amount of noise Γ added in the total reward for k till time t is at most |N k (t)| ≤ Proof: This proof is the same as proof of Theorem 3 in [37] The following corollary establishes the regret bound when the context arrivals are uniformly distributed over the entire context space. This is the worst-case scenario because the algorithm has to learn over the entire context space. Before we derive Corollary 2, we provide a bound on the highest level of active subspace by time.
Lemma 7: Given a time T , the highest level of active subspace is at most log m ( T A )/P + 1. Proof. It is easy to see that the highest possible level of active subspace is achieved when all requests by time have the same context. This requires Am l m a x ≤ T . Therefore, l max = log m ( T A )/P + 1. Corollary 2: If the context arrival by time T is uniformly distributed over the context space, and we set the partition parameter p much larger than similarity parameter α we have
Proof: First we calculate the highest level of subspace when context arrivals are uniform. In the worst case, all level l subspaces will stay active, and then they are deactivated until all level-(l + 1) subspaces become active and so on. Let l max be the maximum level subspace under this scenario. Because there must be some time T < T when all subspaces are level subspaces, we have
where m dl is the maximum number of level l subspaces and Am pl is the maximum number of time slots that belong to a level l subspace. Thus, we have l max < log m ( T A ) d+p + 1 . Combining this conclusion with the regret bound in Theorem 3, we get Corollary 2.
We have shown that the regret upper bound of our private distributed learning model is sublinear in time, implying our computing service vendors can select optimal videos by time. Also, fast convergence to optimal is favorable to dynamically changing big data environments.
2) Differential privacy: We finally prove that our algorithm can preserve privacy of user's contextual information and the that of each service vendor's videos.
Theorem 4: When Algorithm 1 runs with privacy parameter ε, it can preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy for user's contextual information.
Proof: Let x 1 and x 2 be two input context vectors that differ in one single attribute, μ denote the reward of exponential mechanism, R denotes the output (sequence of selected videos) space of exponential mechanism. Then R = {k 1, k 2 , . . . , k M +K −1 }. We suppose that the same user's data stream has come for N times over time arbitrary sequence {t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t N }, as a result, our algorithm selected an arbitrary sequence of arms such that M E (x 1 , μ, R) = {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k N } at the time sequence. We denote μ(x 1 , k i ) the mean reward of arm k i for context x 1 at time t i . In our algorithm μ(x 1 , k i ) equals r k i ,C (t i ). C is the active subspace to which the context x 1 belongs at time. If x 1 and x 2 belong to the same subspace C at time t i , then μ(x 1 , k i ) = μ(x 2 , k i ). We construct a function I(t 1 , x 1 , x 2 ) . When x 1 , x 2 belong to the same active subspace, the value of the function equals one, otherwise zero. We consider the relative probability of our algorithm for given context x 1 and x 2 :
Thus, the theorem follows. Theorem 5: When Algorithm 2 runs with privacy parameter ε, it can preserve (ε, 0)-differential privacy for service vendors' videos.
Proof: For k ∈ M −i and subspace C, let [T ] = {1, . . . , T } denotes the sequence of time slots that videos is selected for simplicity, where T < T . let D = f 1 , . . . , f T be a data set of true rewards. We call a data set D neighbor of D if it differs from D in exactly one reward. We define F t (C) the virtual outcome (reward with noise added), then we have, at each round, the probability of same outcome for different arm k 1 and k 2
In our problem model, the proposed algorithm only accesses the reward for its computation via the tree based aggregation scenario. Learner i maintains M − 1 trees for other learner's reward sets respectively. Each tree guarantee ε = ε (M − 1) differential privacy. With the composition property stated in Corollary 1, we can draw the conclusion that our algorithm 2 is ε-differential private.
Theorem 4 shows that the attributes (e.g., social status, hobby and age) in users' sensitive context vectors cannot be inferred from the recommended results. The proof of Theorem 5 supports that the service vendors fail to extract information about videos in neighbor service vendors' repositories by the rewards. In summary, our Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 prove that the proposed algorithm P-DAP can preserve the both privacy of users and service vendors synchronously.
VI. GEOMETRIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In the previous section, we preserve privacy to the same extend for all subspaces. That is to say, we set the same value of ε for the whole context space. This section presents our refined geometric differentially private model. Considering the sparsity and heterogeneity of big data, some context subspaces are scattered with countless data points, however, other subspaces are nearly blank. A large and increasing number of statistical analyses can be done in a differential private manner while adding little noise. As also declared in [4] , "the larger the dataset, the less a given amount of blurring will affect utility." Thus, our geometric differential private algorithm varies the amount of noised add to subspaces according to the size of each subspace. To be specific, we decrease the privacy level (larger value of ε) when the density of datasets increased (l denotes the density of subspaces). In this way, the performance loss due to the randomness brought by differential privacy can be reduced extensively. For current active subspaces, we set different value of ε related to the density l of them. Specifically, we increase the value of ε when l increases. Fig. 5 gives an illustration of this method. For simplicity, we take the one-dimensional context space for instance. Leaf nodes presented in Fig. 5 are current active subspaces, we set different value of ε related to the density l of each subspaces.
The modified method works as follows. After we get enough context samples, we already have accurate estimations for rewards. From now on, for each context arrival, we first figure out to which subspace it belongs. Then we judge the level l of the subspace and set ε = ε 0 m αl for level-l subspaces, where m and α are constants as we have defined previously. Theorem 6: Geometric differential privacy has a lower regret bound than uniform differential privacy as follows:
where A 1 and A 2 are two constants. When time T goes into infinity, the value of the second term on the right side of the inequality will increase exponentially. Thus, the result of Theorem 6 proves that our geometric differential privacy has greatly reduced the regret bound. We give the proof and the value of A 1 and A 2 in [37] .
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the theoretical regret bounds for our algorithms with empirical results based on very large real-world datasets, which includes massive multimedia data and social media users-generated big data. We show that: 1) regret bounds are sublinear converged over time; 2) Our differentially private methods work well and do not come at the expense of recommendation reward; 3) Geometric differentially private method has a lower regret bound and higher accuracy. Finally, we use users' context vectors refined from real datasets to test the recommendation accuracy (reward) of our algorithms.
A. Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of our recommendation system, training data and test data about users and videos should be gathered. We collect numerous user context vectors extracted from large real datasets in Sina Microblog, a popular online social networking site in China. This datasets contain users' social profiles and multimedia content they shared. We also extract public information from Youku, a prevalent video sharing site (VSS) in China, such as video attributes, popular videos. After preprocessing, around 74 000 video items, 578 000 user context vectors with 13 900-dimension are stored.
For simplicity, we deploy the recommendation system on a small-sized framework with four distributed video service vendors. Using collected video data, we constructed a set of 1000 videos for each service vendor respectively, Following the real situation, we arrange different video items for different service vendors. We randomly sample 200 000 users ( context vectors) from our stored datasets, and input these vectors to our simulative recommendation system sequentially. When receiving user arrival, service vendor selects a particular video to recommend. At the end of this time slot, the reward of this selection, a binary random number (equal 0 or 1), is produce, to imitate the result of user's click action. Since our scheme appertains to the class of online distributed learning techniques, we will compare our scheme against several previous approaches: 1) centralized learning with adaptive partition (CAP) [33] : there is only one learner in this centralized framework who partitions the context space dynamically over time according to the number of user arrivals; 2) distributed learning with uniform partition (DUP) [31] :
this distributed framework contains multiple cooperative learners. But all of them uniformly partition context space initially. No partition process is involved over time; and 3) DAP: this is the primal model of the proposed P-DAP.
Multiple learners in this distributed framework adaptively partition the context space over time (No privacy preservation in this model). Finally, to thoroughly analyze the performance of our proposed algorithms, we logically deploy our experiment by the following four steps:
Step 1: We first compare our primal model DAP with previous work, i.e., CAP [33] and DUP [31] . We input sampled 200 000 users' context vectors sequentially into these three models respectively. That is to say, each model will receive same input datasets with 200000 elements. We plot the regrets and the average regrets (to evaluate the convergence rate) of each model. Afterwards, we extracted four groups (with different size) of user context vectors from collected real datasets. Then, we input these four groups context vectors into CAP, DUP and DAP to test the performance of each model.
Step 2: We construct our differentially private model (P-DAP) based on step 1. As for each vendors' own user, arms (videos and other service vendors) are randomly selected according to computed probabilities. Simultaneously, Laplace noise is added when recommending videos to other service vendors' users. To prove the smooth tradeoff between privacy and accuracy in our P-DAP, we vary the privacy constant ε from 0.01 to 1 and compare them with non-private model (DAP). Finally, we use our extracted four groups of context vectors to test the accuracy of these models.
Step 3: To prove the lower regret of geometric differential private method (GP-DAP), we set different value of ε for different context subspaces. To be specific, the value of ε wax with the decrease of the density of data points in each subspace. Then, we compare the regrets of GP-DAP and P-DAP (ε = 0.01) over time.
B. Results and Analysis
We first evaluate DAP's performances in terms of regret loss and average regret loss in Step 1. In the meanwhile, we compare DAP, CAP and UAP and plot the regret lines in Fig. 6 . Fig. 6(a) shows the comparison with DAP, CAP and DUP in terms of regrets, where the horizontal axis is the number of user arrivals. From the tendency of "Regret" lines, we can draw the conclusion that the regret of DAP is sublinear converged over time. And obviously, DAP has lower regret loss than DUP and CAP all the time. Fig. 6(b) records the average regrets (normalized by number of arrivals) of DAP, CAP and DUP, where the horizontal axis is the number of user arrivals. As we can see, our primal model DAP converges fast and has lower average accuracy then CAP and DUP. Also, results show the average regret of DAP in the tail of lines is extremely small (smaller than 0.02 per user). Table II records the average accuracies (total reward divided by number of arrivals) in our tested process, where N represents the number of context vectors used by test. We find that as the number of arrivals increased, the average accuracies of each model get promoted as well. This could be resulted from the fact that systems trained better as number of samples increased. Also, we can read from the table that the average accuracy of our DAP can reach up to 92%, but neither those of CAP nor DUP can exceed 80%. Finally, We can draw the conclusion that DAP outperforms CAP and DUP. Fig. 7 gives the simulation experiment results of P-DAP. Fig. 7(a) shows both the regrets of P-DAP and DAP are sublinear over time. To be specific, we can see from the tendency of regret lines that as privacy preservation level get increased (smaller ε), regrets converged more slowly. Fig. 7(b) shows our differentially private P-DAP has low-regret (no more than 0.03 per time slot) even for a high level of privacy preservation (e.g., ε = 0.01). The regret obtained by the non-private algorithm has the lowest regret as expected. More significantly, the regret gets closer to the non-private regret as its privacy preservation is weaker. Table III records our tested average accuracies for DAP and P-DAP with different privacy preservation level. As we can read from the table, average accuracy of DAP can reach to 91.56% and those of our P-DAP with different values of ε is greater than 80% by time. Fig. 8 shows our simulation results of GP-DAP and P-DAP, where we set ε = 0.01. From Fig. 8 (a) tells us the regret of GP-DAP is less than that of P-DAP by 32%. We can immediately draw the conclusion that GP-DAP cut the regret loss extensively. We also use different set of data with different volume to test the accuracies of P-DAP and GP-DAP. Fig. 8(b) shows the comparison of these average accuracies. Both GP-DAP and P-DAP have high accuracy for each group, and the accuracies become slightly higher when increasing the sizes of groups. Obviously, GP-DAP always has higher accuracy than P-DAP.
Table IV records the test result of GP-DAP and P-DAP (ε = 0.01) of different user groups. At first glance, the accuracies increased slightly as we add more context samples into test group. This is due to the fact that, more samples can help systems get better estimation of each processing functions. Also, we can see that, the average accuracy of the GP-DAP will be greater than 88% as number of user arrivals exceed 30 000.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a differentially private learning framework for video recommendation for OSNs. To tackle with the large volume and heterogeneity of big data, we employe a adaptive space partition method to improve the convergence rate. Concerned with the privacy of social network users and video service vendors, we use Exponential Mechanism and Laplace Mechanism in our model simultaneously. Furthermore, to alleviate the performance loss due to introducing differential privacy, we refine our framework to novel geometric differentially private model. We have theoretically analyzed our algorithms in terms of performance loss (regret) and privacy preserving level. We have also evaluated our algorithms, demonstrating their sublinear converged regrets, delicate tradeoff between performance loss and privacy preserving level.
